Cyber Security Attacks: Types, Cases, and Mitigation Strategies Assignment Sample

Cyber Security Attacks: Types, Cases, and Mitigation Strategies

Introduction - Exploring Types of Cyber Attacks and Mitigation Strategies

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Section 1: Introduction

The Cyber Security Attack is a challenge by means of cyber scandalous, hackers or further digital antagonists to admit a computer set of connections or structure, typically intended for the intention of varying, thieving, obliterating, or revealing in sequence (Hanic et al. 2018).

The Cyber Attacks be able to aim at an extensive variety of fatalities as of particularized clients to ventures or even administrations. When objective commerce or the additional associations, the hacker’s main aim is to admit responsive as well as expensive company property, such as rational property, consumer’s information, or the reimbursement information (Cheng et al. 2020).

Widespread category of Cyber Attacks

1. Ransomware Attacks
2. Malware
3. Malware as a Service (MaaS)
4. DoS and DDoS Attacks
5. Phishing
6. MITM Attack
7. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
8. SQL Injections
9. DNS Tunnelling
10. Password Attack
11. Birthday Attacks
12. Drive-by Attack
13. Crypto-jacking (Fang et al. 2019)

Section 2: Description of attacks

Section 2.1: Colonial Pipeline Attack

Thus probably, the Colonial Pipeline assault is perhaps the greatest notorious of 2021 (Kim et al. 2021). DarkSide, a Russian hacker gang, reportedly took authorship for the assault, which targeted SCADA structures and interconnect infrastructures to typical IT set of connections but seems to be World Wide Web. 

DarkSide aggressively executed this assault by concentrating upon the IT infrastructure of Colonial Pipeline's functional SCADA architecture. Colonial Pipeline protection personnel undertook the wise precaution of shutting back that equipment while the operation progressed, thereby minimizing the destruction but resulting in the abrupt shutdown of a major gasoline conduit, causing a national delivery constraint that severely harmed customers (Barboni et al. 2019).

DarkSide gained access to Colonial Pipeline's infrastructure by utilizing hacked verification tokens from an outdated operating platform that lacked twin verification. Intruders broke through into the connection and downloaded a bundled malicious payload further into the machine.

Utilizing a non-recoverable Power-Shell program, DarkSide's ransomware wipes the Recycle Bin and deletes hard backups (Aldawood, and Skinner, 2019). It inhibits Windows functions and focuses stopped activities prior to actually encoding data repeatedly unless internal and global resources are entirely protected. It sends this information to a C2 domain designated by the perpetrator prior to actually destroying its original version and publishing the extortion letter.

Subsection 2.1.1: Cyber security Terminologies in attack 1

Throughout a testimony even under Senate Committees on National Defense Charles Carmakal, executive deputy chairman and CTO at espionage business Mandiant stated that intruders gained access to the Colonial Pipeline infrastructure using unsecured credentials for a VPN connection.

Several businesses use VPNs to enable private, encoded distant connections to their internal computer. So pursuant to Carmakal's evidence, a Colonial Pipeline technician – whose wasn't recognized openly throughout the hearing – most probably utilized the identical credentials for the VPN there at the area. Those credentials were stolen in the conjunction with another security flaw (Nguyen et al. 2020). Credential reutilization has proven a regular issue, as several people frequently employ identical credentials numerous times.

Colonial Pipeline attack timeline

The destruction and restoration of both the Colonial Pipeline occurred at a quick speed in a limited amount of period.

• The first attack and information leakage
• A malware onslaught commences
• Colonial Pipeline learns about the rupture.
• Mandiant, a protection company, was invited to analyse and defend against the incident.
• The incident was reported to legal police and major congressional officials.
• The conduit has been knocked inactive to minimize the danger of contamination to the operating infrastructure (Shayan et al. 2019).
• Colonial Pipeline agrees to cough up money of 75 cryptocurrencies to the cybercriminals.
• President Joe Biden declares a state of exigency.
• The conduit has been reopened, and regular activities have returned.
• The Bureau of Defense statistics retrieves 63.7 bit coin ($2.3 million) first from assailants (Li et al. 2019).
• A Senate investigation on the incident has been scheduled.

Subsection 2.1.2: Technical controls of the 2 terminologies of attack 1

These Colonial Pipeline attackers were recognized as members of the Dark Side organization. Assailants issue an extortion demand as a component of a wannacry assault, that either is usually they disclose one. Hackers really don't be compensated if hackers don't demand extortion, and actually being paid is really what wannacry is all around. Assailants use “wannacry” to protect an organization’s information and hold it, prisoner, unless an amount is paid. Eventually paid perpetrators are meant to offer a security code, allowing sufferers to restore their information (Aldawood, and Skinner, 2019).

Dark Side’s initial officially documented action occurred, whenever it launched a destructive operation in which it infected individuals with malware. DarkSide is believed to be based in European Countries or Russia, while there is no documented relationship to every democratic country’s activities (Ani et al. 2017). The Russian administration has likewise claimed any role with Dark Side or the assault on the infrastructure company.

Dark Side’s principal form of operation is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) approach. Dark Side’s extortion powers are made available to certain other malicious attackers through RaaS. Rather than generating their original wanna cry, additional malicious organizations could employ RaaS versus trafficked persons (Jin et al. 2018).

Section 2.2: CNA Financial Attack

CNA Financial Attack is among the country's major healthcare businesses. In the corporation revealed the incident, claiming claimed it had been the target of a comprehensive data breach (Demertzis, and Iliadis, 2019). The corporation agreed with a reduction in the payment from $60 million to $40 million-plus compensated for the master password required to maintain functioning.

Phoenix, a cybercriminals gang, asserted involvement in the operation (Sánchez et al. 2019). The reporting standards are a form of adware known as Phoenix Locker, which would be a variation of the relatively widely employed Hade’s extortion software.

CNA Financials' homepage was down for over two months following the hack. It did not publish the details of the operation until 2 months after receiving the extortion, once it was required by legislation to do this again. The Phoenix espionage virus operates by impersonating a webpage refresh (Li and Liu, 2021). It clones workers into applying the repair and then expands horizontal throughout the architecture to gain larger capacities before launching the fourth stage 2 of the operation. Phoenix should not have been able to replicate, encrypt, and transfer information again from CNA context to the terrorist's internet profile if obfuscation prevention had been enabled (Falco et al. 2018). Authorities discovered that the perpetrators intended to extort individuals using extremely personal material.

Subsection 2.2.1: Cyber security Terminologies in attack 2

In this year, CNA Medical Company was the victim of an influential in sequence fortification offense, who has interrupted the industrial company's infrastructure and damaged various CNA technologies, particularly company communications.

Information was scarce somewhere at the scene of the invasion, and though CNA started to act quickly – instantaneously enlisting a squad of third-party coroner's professionals to examine and ascertain the entire extent of the altercation, as well as co-operating with legislation regulation – it had been unclear yet if some business or consumer information had been ex-filtrated (Sahoo et al. 2021).

The insurance said that it had completed its examination through into digital safety problem (Gunduz, and Das, 2018). The inquiry showed that perhaps the malicious attacker penetrated specific CNA networks according to the corporation. While executing the wannacry, the malicious attacker grabbed data within this time span.

According to the US carrier, the intruders initially gained access to an individual's workstations by delivering a bogus and dangerous Firefox patch through a reputable webpage.

The cyber attackers performed investigation throughout CNA's IT infrastructure between employing genuine technologies and privileges to escape observation and create endurance, according to the demand letter lodged via fresh Hampshire's Legal representative Advocate Department (Hernandez-Suarez et al. 2020).

The Attack Performer disrupted surveillance but also protection technologies, damaged and deactivated some CNA copies, and installed malware onto specific computers inside the infrastructure, prompting CNA to aggressively suspend computers worldwide as an emergency quarantine step (Abdi et al. 2018). According to individuals acquainted well with assault, the Phoenix Crypto Locker locked upwards of 15,500 devices after installing malware packages on CNA's infrastructure.

Subsection 2.2.2: Technical controls of the 2 terminologies of attack 2

Thus according to effective safety administration consultancy Cloud-SEK, this latest malicious strain Phoenix Crypto-Locker suspected to be tied to Russian danger organization Evil Corp, was likely employed in the March wannacry assault on CNA (Soe et al. 2020).

According to Cloud-SEK, the extortion program is similar to that working through Evil Corp in precedent efforts (Kure et al. 2018). Phoenix Crypto-Locker attacks credentials by means of numerous suffixes, delivering a blackmail message, in addition to the danger director's label phoenix hotline leftovers.

Phoenix Crypto-Locker, according to Cloud-SEK, leverages remote computer interface or gets hold of a password to obtain the connection to the super-computers while posturing as legal applications certified with a documentation authorization abounding by Saturday City Ltd (Sahoo et al. 2021).

According to CNA's response to ISMG, the malware attacks organization, Phoenix, accountable for this assault is not an authorized organization, but no US federal institution has established a tie among the collective that targeted CNA as well as any authorized institution (Lamba, 2018). CNA has conducted darknet scanning and queries for CNA-related material, but researchers had already found none-substantiation that records connected towards this assault are now becoming held in common or abused (Kurt et al. 2018).

Section 2.3: HAFNIUM Cyber Attack

HAFNIUM specifically affects organisations in the United States of America, particularly contagious illness investigators, legal companies, tertiary learning organizations, defence corporations, opinionated association, as well as non-governmental associations (Sakhnini et al. 2019).

HAFNIUM has before now infiltrated populace through leveraging loopholes in World Wide Web platforms and has exploited genuinely accessible platforms for management and administration, such as Convention (Limba et al. 2019). HAFNIUM often entry ways information to document swapping services like MEGA subsequent to ahead entrance to a targeted computer.

Microsoft becomes aware of HAFNIUM appealing by means of susceptible Microsoft 365 installations in operations unconnected to such problems (Lyu s 2019). Even when they are regularly unproductive in accessing client’s identities, this espionage process agreed to the adversary to be taught extra concerning the backgrounds of the objectives.

HAFNIUM mainly proceeds from contracted fundamental confidential servers in The US.

Subsection 2.3.1: Cyber security Terminologies in attack 3

Microsoft is announces the accompanying in sequence to help out the consumers in considerate the line of process that is working by means of HAFNIUM to leverage those weaknesses as well as enable additional good protection versus probable attempts targeting unencrypted machines (Liu et al. 2019).

• CVE-2021-26855 is an Outlook server-side request forgery (SSRF) issue with the intention of facilitates the hacker to put forward unauthorized HTTP responses while authenticating as the Outlook host (Liu et al. 2018).
• CVE-2021-26857 is a problem in the Amalgamated Communication agency's unsafe facilitates the process. Unprotected reduplication occurs when a program desterilizes untrustworthy user-controllable content (Maglaras s 2019). HAFNIUM was able to execute applications as Administrator on the Outlook host after leveraging this weakness. These necessitate supervisor access or additional flaw to be exploited.
• CVE-2021-26858 Outlook has an after accessing uncontrolled document access issue. If HAFNIUM was able to log in using the Outlook network, they may employ such a defect to upload a record to each and every position just on the domain controller (Ogie, 2017). Hackers might register through leveraging the CVE-2021-26855 SSRF issue or obtaining the passwords of a valid superintendent.

Subsection 2.3.2: Technical controls of the 2 terminologies of attack 3

HAFNIUM attackers created internet interfaces on the hacked website following leveraging those weaknesses to obtain preliminary control (Kravchik and Shabtai, 2018). Such intruders developed internet connections on the compromised page after exploiting such flaws to gain exploratory control. Internet ports have the ability to enable hackers to bypass information and do other destructive operations, leading to even further penetration.

Regrettably, the target business didn't maintain any records or investigative evidence from its Outlook system which might have permitted Darktrace to determine the negligible vulnerability (Paté?Cornell et al. 2018). Nevertheless, there's real research showing that such Outlook infrastructure flaws were exploited.

The culprits used the Outlook system for monitoring every IP inside a contiguous networks on terminals 80, 135, 445, and 8080 after acquiring management using the unique concepts of the internet link (Fang et al. 2019).

The Outlook host has previously established that many fresh unsuccessful interconnections to that exact domain upon these important endpoints before (Srinivas et al. 2019). In contrast to identifying the aforementioned hostile behavior, Darktrace's Cyber AI Analyst independently evaluated and commented on the issue, highlighting the corporate espionage and sideways motion activities in a unified, unified occurrence (Kostyuk et al. 2019).

Darktrace's Endeavor Immunology Platform protects thousands of machines for the corporation. Nonetheless, the Hafnium infiltration remained among the leading five occurrences noted in Cyber AI Analyst within a one-week timeframe (Tvaronavi?ien? et al. 2020). Although a tiny or overburdened protection crew having just a handful of moments each quarter to evaluate the most serious instances might well have spotted and examined this danger (Liu et al. 2020).

Section 3: Conclusion

In my estimation, every kind of crime either online or offline that ought to never be accepted. The security in addition to the well-being of the populace is supposed to be watched over. Everybody ought to have a right to survive in a protected surrounding, notwithstanding in actual life or on the web.

Associations are pronouncement themselves beneath the weight of being enforced to respond swiftly to the energetically growing numeral of cyber security intimidation. In view of the fact that the invaders have been utilizing a strike life cycle, associations have also been enforced to turn up by means of a susceptibility administration life cycle (Lykou et al. 2020). The susceptibility administration life cycle is intended to contradict the labours completed by the invaders in the quickest along with most effectual technique. This section has talked about the susceptibility administration life cycle in conditions of the susceptibility administration line of attack. It has undergone the steps of advantages stock formation, the administration of in sequence flow, the evaluation of consequences, in addition to the evaluation of vulnerabilities, exposure along with remediation, and lastly the development of the suitable reactions (Liang et al. 2018). It has clarified the significance of every step in the susceptibility administration stages in addition to how everything ought to be approved out.

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