P&IDs, SIL Levels, and Safety Requirements for Process Industries Assignment Answer

P&IDs, SIL Levels, and Safety Requirements for Process Industries

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Introduction -Process Diagram Design and Control Scheme Development

Question 1: What are the Key Elements for Ensuring Functional Safety in Process Industries?

P&IDS works only for maintenance and also for modification of a process that can be graphically represented. The design of the diagram provides the casual basis for the development of the control schemes. The graphical representation for the processing file is structured below Instrumental details and key piping, Shutdown scheme and control, Safety and regulatory requirements, and Basic start-up and operation information. P&IDs is a schematic explanation in the way of functional piping relationship, system equipment components, (Pesericoet al. 2018) and instrumentation is available for the field of control and instrumentation. The main facilities require hard mechanical and chemical steps with the construction of P&IDs to build a plant and maintain the safety of the plant.

SIL level is a safety Integrity level that is a combination of two voluntary standards and plant owners mainly use it to quantify the performance of safety that may be necessary for hazard operations.

• IEC 61508: Electronic systems Electronic Survival Systems: Functional Safety
• IEC 61511: Process Industry Sector Constant Monitoring Systems.

There are four SIL Levels, according to IEC standards (1-4). A higher SIL Level indicates a higher process danger and a higher level of SIS protection. To summaries how SIL Level is calculated,

Safety Life Cycle

The safety life cycle needs to be understood to determine the SIL process level of hazard. The Safety Life Cycle is a concept defined by the IEC standards. As per the safety lifecycle, it provides an environment where a framework is a work repeatedly there all the process are hazards and identified and then analyzed to know the hazards is required for the cyclic process is not count as a linear process of understanding any changes to process design. For operation, any condition any type of equipment is required to recall back to the starting phase to make sure there are no errors or hazards.

Process hazard analysis

It is a systematic assessment of all of the biohazards including at an industrial process level. It is very mandatory to monitor all the hazards including fire, explosion, and flammable material. Many things can impact the process like

• Equipment failures
• Calibration issue Instrumentation failure
• Utility loss
• Error caused by human
• Earthquake and storm

The severity and frequency of every process need to be analyzed.

That analysis includes tank spells which happen any time it finds a manual operation. Also damage localization, (Khatunet al. 2020) with the fire explosion and also with the toxic gas release it could be performed.

A layer of Protection Analysis

Not a single measure of safety can eliminate all risks alone. That's why a proper safety protocol is necessary where the system of safety has many protective layers. In this way, ( Iturbeet al 2018 ) if one of the safety layers is not performed well then all the other layers work alongside that layer to provide perfect protection. As well as the reliability increases of the layer of protection increases as well. In the normalized way of different protection layers. The independent layer consists of each function that can connect independently with other layers.

There are many types of protection layers including

• Systems of fire exhaustion
• Systems of leak containment
• Valves to release the pressure
• System to warn gas and detect gas

The steps of a LOPA are

• The non-SIS safety measures list
• Each layer there has its own risk of hazard that needs to be reduced
• Calculation of hazard frequency

Like if it can be said that a bucket fill operation is done where the bucket is filled 520 times in a year but it is filled out in an event where that bucket is filled about 520 times in a year.

Data from table 2 it can find out the probability of failure on demand average (PFDavg) is 8.4015 for the sensor subsystem and for the logic solver the value of PFDavg is 80.0065 and for the last, not the least the final element score is 0.735.

Safety Instrumentation and its system including function

For the safety instrumented systems, their function's main role is to develop a safe state after determining the setpoints to be exceeded and after the safe operation has to transgress.

The primary goal of SIS is to risk reduction and implement safety features which are safety instrumented Functions.

• Bucket overfill SIF SIS can stop filling buckets at a pre-fill time
• Higher temperature SIS can start a relay that is used to cut the power to connect a heater circuit at a very early determined and safe temperature.

SIL	Required Risk Reduction Factor
1	10 to 100 (101 to 102)
2	10 to 100 (101 to 102)
3	10 to 100 (101 to 102)
4	10 to 100 (101 to 102)

Overfill a bucket that can be determined after applying a non-sis layer of protection there are 205 times of frequency which is an effective frequency if after every 10 years the hazard frequency in accepted then the SIF should have an RRF (Risk reduction Factor)

Like if it can be said that a bucket fill operation is done where the bucket is filled 520 times in a year but it is filled out in an event where that bucket is filled about 520 times in a year.

Data from table 2 it can find out the probability of failure on demand average (PFDavg) is 8.4015 for the sensor subsystem and for the logic solver the value of PFDavg is 80.0065 and for the last, not the least the final element score is 0.735.

The safety life cycle needs to be understood to determine the SIL process level of hazard. The Safety Life Cycle is a concept defined by the IEC standards. (Xieet al 2018) As per the safety lifecycle, it provides an environment where a framework is a work repeatedly there all the process are hazards and identified and then analyzed to know the hazards is required for the cyclic process is not count as a linear process of understanding any changes to process design. For operation, any condition any type of equipment is required to recall back to the starting phase to make sure there are no errors or hazards.

The mean statistics and failure in-between time and average failure rate got lots of attention lately in this storage world, and there are three studies devoted to the last year's topic. MTBF is a growing term that disrupts an industry as people are unaware of the numbers.

Question 2 What are the key components of a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF), and how can it potentially fail in fulfilling its intended function?

Many parts of a whole defend, like Hazard and Regulatory Compliance, are critical to demonstrating that the Target Iso for an associated control duty has been met.SIL Evaluation, Risk Assessment, and Safety Requirements. Phases 1 through 10 of the IEC 61508 norms are allocation and realizationlifecycle of safety. These stages are detailed elsewhere in this guidebook. A proof needed to prove that an automatic monitoring framework fulfils its Targets SIL (i.e., the SIL Achievement exercise) is much more than a quantitative exercise based purely on target failure measurements. Technical limits along with Algorithmic capacity must be regarded. The next sections explain how much of this data is recognized, evaluated, and used to accomplish SIL.SIL Accomplishment is just a statement that now the Target SIL, as determined by SIL Assessment, has been fulfilled for each Safety Instrumented Function in line with IEC61508. The process measures are required to achieve SIL for a safety instrumented function:

• Architectural Constraints - Safe Failure Rate (SFF) and Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT)
• Condition Deteriorates Measure, which may be represented as: Pfd, alternatively.
• In terms of Systematic Capability,
  • Every element* that performs a safety function.
  • The procedure for developing and implementing the safety instrumented function.

It is essential to comprehend and accurately describe the duties allocated to each organization participating in providing the safety instrumented system before beginning any element of the safety lifecycle. This is especially important while conducting SIL Achievement since SIL Achievement is now very hard to execute even without proper activities, mechanisms, and data (outputs) specified during the front-end activities of the Overall Safety Lifecycle. Furthermore, the precision and process where they correspond to each automatic monitoring function may be challenged, daunting the initial concept assumptions.

2.B

Because of the high frequency of demand, the safety function switches to continuous mode. PFDavg does not apply in this case, and the proof test has no bearing on safety. It's also impossible to take credit for the diagnostics because they're so sluggish. As a result, the effective harmful error rate is 0.0024 every year, approximately 2.7 x 10-7 per hr. which will be between the 10-7 to 10-6 thresholds that define SIL 2 for continuous mode operation.

2.C

Many members of the functional safety community mistakenly assume that a SIF's SIL is entirely defined by its PFDavg in slow growth mode and its probability of (hazardous) breakdown per hour (PFH) in constant demand mode. Actually, a SIF's overall SIL is decided by the minimum SIL achieved by the SIF while taking into account three distinct constraints: a thorough capability (SC) constraint, an architectural constraint (SILac), and the achievable PFDavg or PFH. exida refers to these constrictions as the "through in." If a risk reduction factor (RRF) was given in the SIF criteria for a SIF designed to operate in slow growth mode, therefore 1/PFDavg should also focus on meeting the stated RRF.IEC 61508 is a foundational norm that original edition precedes the numerous subsequent standards generated from it. These latter standards place a greater emphasis on the demands of certain sectors. IEC 61511 is a process industry standard that is built on the ideas of IEC 61508. IEC 61511 seems to be the primary reference, with information from IEC 61508 incorporated where it is particularly pertinent to the topic of IEC 61511.

2.D

Sensor elements, a reasoning solver item, and final components make up a SIF in principle. The SIF monitors a process, decides if it is running within acceptable boundaries, and intervenes as needed if the process deviates from those limitations. The SIF itself is vulnerable to failure in one of two ways. The SIF can mistakenly assume that a properly working process is running beyond of its permissible boundaries and interfere in the process operation incorrectly. This is known as a SIF secured failure. Alternatively, the SIF may fail is rendering it where it is unable of evaluating if the process is within acceptable boundaries and or responding effectively when the process deviates from those limits.The notion of risk reduction is of vital importance in the formulation of the health requirement gathering for E/E/PE safety related systems (in particular, the safety integrity requirements component of the safety requirement gathering), according to IEC61508-5 (clause A.2). The goal of calculating the acceptable risk for a certain hazardous event is to determine what is considered reasonable in terms of something like the harmful event's recurrence (or likelihood) and specific effects. Protection systems are intended to lower the occurrence (or likelihood) of dangerous events as well as their effects.

Question 3 What is a High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS) and How Does it Ensure Safety in the Process Industry?

3.A

An overtopping incident can cause pollution, technology, and workers when working in high-pressure situations and production zones. The difficulty of managing that risk on producing wells and conduits is the one which a HIPPS may help with.The IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 standards are used to design and build a HIPPS. When Dependable pressure protection for downstream systems offers a solution to safeguard equipment, workers, and the surroundings, these conventions relate to safe operation and safety designed to operate systems. A HIPPS is a solution that closes every source of airburst within the specified timeframe while including duplication in the implementers (pressure detectors), logic solver, and final items (power outage valves) with at less this very same dependability as a safety mechanism.Buttons (1o2) or multiple (2o3) (voter) strain gauge output, a dynamic logic solver, and two side hydraulically activated safety valves, the hydraulic (mechanical) HIPPS offers an identity, independent protective system that operates on demand. A hydraulic pump unit can give extra real-time capabilities to the equipment, which is normally self-powered (HPU). The system is pressurized, and the safeguard shutdown valves are opened. Until an aberrant state is discovered, the system stays open (armed). The technology locks the two operated final part valves whenever an abnormal problem is discovered, safeguarding downstream operation or infrastructure.

3.B

"Security risk management allows individuals, organizations, and communities to assess the nature of potential threats and how they interact" (Standards Australia, 2006, p. 6). The risk mitigation procedure may be used in the context of security risk management in general. Indeed, the Iso 27001 process must be utilized as the basis for risk mitigation in the larger company; nevertheless, risk management plan includes a number of specific procedures that other types of risk control do not take into account.

3.C

A HIPPS is a solution that closes every source of airburst within the specified timeframe while including duplication in the implementers (pressure detectors), logic solver, and final items (power outage valves) with at less this very same dependability. As a safety mechanism.Buttons, (1o2) or multiple (2o3) (voter) strain gauge output, a dynamic logic solver, and two side hydraulically activated safety valves, the hydraulic (mechanical) HIPPS offers an identity, independent protective system that operates on demand. A hydraulic pump unit can give extra real-time capabilities to the equipment, which is normally self-powered (HPU). The system is pressurized, and the safeguard shutdown valves are opened. Until an aberrant state is discovered, the system stays open (armed). The technology locks the two operated final part valves whenever an abnormal problem is discovered, safeguarding downstream operation or infrastructure.The standard defines security zones as "groups of physical or logical assets with strictly delineated physical or logical borders that meet similar security needs." Conduits link these zones and must have security mechanisms in place to manage access, withstand legitimate user assaults, stop the occurrence of any other sort of attack, function as a shield for other network systems, and preserve the accuracy the security the information. An objective security level (SLT) is required for a security zone, which is based on criticality and impact criteria. The security zone's equipment must provide a set of security delivery (SLC) that is similar to a SLT.

3.D

You have a legal obligation to analyses the risks to your workers' health and safety (as well as hazards to the health and safety of non-employees) that they face while at work. You should contact staff and fitness specialists while conducting a risk assessment. It's a great method to involve the people who do the task. They are aware of the dangers and the possibility for harmful shortcuts and issues. If employees participate in the development of health and safety policies in their workplace, they seem to be more likely to recognize why measures are implemented to manage risks or to maintain such.

Question 4 How did URS Corp, Emerson, and ACE Collaborate to Develop a SIL 3 Compliant HIPPS System as per IEC Standards?

4.A

URS Corp.'s relationship with Emerson Continuous Improvement and local businessperson (LBP) Application Equipment (ACE) in construct a number of comprehensive, pressurized safety systems is just one of several unique projects to still be showcased at this year's Emerson Exchange (HIPPS). The technologies are also used to separate and safeguard gas processing plants against high pipeline tensions, replacing flares, pressure - reducing valves, including rupture discs with a more beautiful and ecologically friendly alternative.

4.B

But, so according Ibn Smith, general supervision I&C engineer for URS, and colleagues Robert Mentioning “, URS professional services engineer, and Eric Schultz, control system specialist for ACE, ensuring that a slapdash HIPPS workaround fulfils level three guaranteed service level (SIL 3) prerequisites as stated in IEC 61511 but instead 61508 standards would have been no easy task. The study they are presenting is however a contender for such Plant web Award Winner this year.

Conclusion

It can be concluded after answering all of the question that the safety life cycle needs to be understood to determine the SIL process level of hazard. The Safety Life Cycle is a concept defined by the IEC standards. As per the safety lifecycle, it provides an environment where a framework is a work repeatedly there all the process are hazards and identified and then analyzed to know the hazards is required for the cyclic process is not count as a linear process of understanding any changes to process design. For operation, any condition any type of equipment is required to recall back to the starting phase to make sure there are no errors or hazards.

Reference

Iturbe, X., Venu, B., Jagst, J., Ozer, E., Harrod, P., Turner, C. and Penton, J., 2018. Addressing functional safety challenges in autonomous vehicles with the arm TCL S architecture. IEEE Design & Test, 35(3), pp.7-14.

Peserico, G., Morato, A., Tramarin, F. and Vitturi, S., 2021. Functional Safety Networks and Protocols in the Industrial Internet of Things Era. Sensors, 21(18), p.6073.

Tchórzewska-Cie?lak, B., Pietrucha-Urbanik, K. and Eid, M., 2021. Functional safety concept to support hazard assessment and risk management in water-supply systems. Energies, 14(4), p.947.

Xie, G., Li, Y., Han, Y., Xie, Y., Zeng, G. and Li, R., 2020. Recent advances and future trends for automotive functional safety design methodologies. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 16(9), pp.5629-5642.

Khatun, M., Glaß, M. and Jung, R., 2020, November. Scenario-based extended hara incorporating functional safety and sotif for autonomous driving. In Proceedings of the 30th European Safety and Reliability Conference and 15th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference (pp. 53-59).